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The USA–Turkey–Middle East: From
the 20th Century to the Present
Nur Bilge Criss
This study compares the cold war period and contemporary issues which involve the
triangle with a focus on Iraq, Syria and Egypt. It traces turning points in the 20th
century, present dilemmas and conclusions in a state of flux. Major conclusions are: that
a cold war is re-emerging because of Russia’s assertion of its world power status and
Washington’s claims to world leadership. The other is the conspicuous similarity in
Turkey between the Democratic Party (1950–60) and the incumbent government who
assume(d) that history, civilizational geopolitics and economy would facilitate transition
of its proximate neighbourhood into American new world order(s). Evidence suggests
why these efforts failed.
This study compares two epochs, the cold war period as well as the contemporary
spillover effects of the cold war on the USA, Turkey and the Middle East triangle. It
comprises two major sections: ‘The USA and Turkey–Middle East Connection: The
20th Century’ and ‘The Present’, followed by ‘Conclusions in a State of Flux’. Instead
of the entirety of the geography, focus is on Turkey’s proximate neighbours, Iraq,
Syria and Egypt. Comparison allows certain conclusions to be drawn.
Firstly, a new cold peace may be threatening because of the Syrian crisis. This crisis
may be a litmus test for Russia’s assertion of its world power status. In addition,
Russia opposes global missile defence systems, intervention in Syria and Iran, and
refuses to liquidate Soviet-era nuclear weapons even at America’s expense.1 More
importantly, in January 2012, Vladimir Putin’s campaign team ‘has been insisting
that the White House was behind the recent protest rallies in Russia, sponsoring the
opposition in the hope of an orange revolution’.2 Shutting down USAID programmes
in Russia signalled that the concerns were real.3 Secondly, comparison reveals that
with the exception between 2000 and 2010, Turkey’s relations with Syria have been
conflict ridden, and is likely to remain so because of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’
Party) foothold in northern Syria, supported by the northern Iraqi autonomous
Kurdistan.
Thirdly, the latest crisis serves to deepen the division between Arabs and Turks
despite the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) religiously coloured identity
politics. Put simply, Turkey is not an Arab country. Even though Arabs live under
q 2013 Taylor & Francis
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 2013
Vol. 15, No. 2, 143–156, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2013.775023
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:2
8 0
7 M
ay
 20
14
 
different states, they speak the same language and the reference point is to supra-
national Arabism. Ehud Toledano, an Ottoman historian, stated that Egypt is the
leader of the Arab world. Ankara’s commercial, financial and strategic interests in the
region are not enough to be accepted as a model, let alone as a regional leader.4
Last, but not least, is the similarity between the Democrat Party (DP, 1950–60)
government and JDP’s (2002–) outlook on the Arab countries. The former assumed
that historic ties would be sufficient to attract the Arabs to security pacts. The latter
expanded on this premise with two major ideas: that economy overcomes all
problems, and civilizational geopolitics will make Turkey a regional power.
The next section covers the major turning points in relations during the 20th
century when encounters were extremely challenging. Turkey began to employ fine-
tuned diplomacy towards the Middle East, despite confrontational relations with
Syria in the 1960s, to be discussed later. Until the 21st century, balancing relations
with allies and others was of foremost importance to Turkish diplomacy. The interim
period between 1964 until the end of the century was marked by gradual
multilateralism in Turkey’s foreign policies towards the Soviet Union as well as the
Middle East, whereby caution against direct involvement in inter-/intra-Arab or the
Arab–Israel disputes and conflicts remained paramount. A credible threat against
Syria in 1997 to expel the terrorist PKK leader, Abdullah O¨calan, from Damascus had
worked, but only in the aftermath of the cold war, concomitant with Turkey’s
determination and the military agreement signed with Israel in 1996.5
Nonetheless, foreign policy decision-making, leadership profiles, style and rhetoric
changed radically as of 2002. The ‘new’ foreign policy is inspired by the ambition to
establish a commonwealth based on the former Ottoman geography as well as rather
broad and vague concepts such as ‘strategic depth’, ‘zero problems with neighbours’,6
populism and a new outlook on geopolitics. According to Bilgin and Bilgic¸:
while there is significant continuity in various actors’ recourse to
geopolitics in justifying their preferred choices for Turkey’s foreign policy,
Davutog˘lu and other JDP policymakers’ discourse is distinctive in the way
in which they invoke civilizational geopolitics . . . Civilizational geopolitics
is an understanding of culture and civilization as preordained determinants
of international behavior.7
The present epoch is discussed in three concentric circles. The first circle involves the
post-cold war dynamics of disintegration in connection to regional crises starting
with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which prompted new norms such as humanitarian
intervention and international collective responsibility to protect people against
atrocities in cases where the state fails to do so. However, transforming a legitimate
moral norm into international law proved difficult, if not impossible. The challenge
that legitimacy as opposed to legality poses, brings the issue to the end of the cold war
when the USA enjoyed unipolarity for two decades.
The second circle of the saga concerns American foreign policies. The dissolution
of the Soviet Union endowed the USA with a great sense of triumphalism.8 Secondly,
the war on terror directly bonded national security to the success of globalization sine
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qua non. This meant bringing those countries which had not kept up with
globalization to the core by force, if need be. It was necessary that ‘America equate its
national security with that of globalization’s continued survival and success’, wrote
Thomas Barnett. Thus, he reconnected national security strategy to global peace
strategy akin to the cold war when the national interests of the free world were
bonded to American national interests.9
The third concentric circle involves juxtapositions in Turkey’s ‘new’ regional
policies, the most peculiar of which was to deliberately alienate Israel, hardly an option.
The other issue is Turkey’s involvement in the latest Syrian crisis by taking sides, which
opened the country not only to refugees among whom are opposition members of all
shades, but also foreign jihadist elements. Recently, Robert Fisk asked the inevitable
question of whether Turkey was becoming the Pakistan of the Middle East, a most
disconcerting, but realistic question.10 The analogy is about being a conduit of
weapons to fight the Taliban for the former, and to fight the Syrian Army in the second
case. It does not take long then, to invite additional terrorist actions in the conduit’s
own territory.
The study concludes that comparison of the past and today under the aegis of the
USA, Turkey and the proximate Middle East reveals similar patterns even in widely
different conjunctures. The current upheaval in Syria may either be the harbinger of
a new cold war/peace between the Russian Federation and the USA, or may present
an opportunity to draw the former, through negotiation, into the Great Power
economic core by opening up to multinational corporations. That said, this may be a
difficult enterprise although Moscow became a member of the World Trade
Organization in August 2012, because it is keen on asserting its own world power
status. A new form of rivalry is in the making while the USA also insists on its role as
world leader.11 Some view this status seeking as ‘US foreign policy adventurism’.12
Regarding Syria’s largest commercial city Aleppo, Ho¨rstel wrote:
Whenever the US warns there is an imminent danger of violence, even of
massacre or atrocities, it pays to take notice. Such predictions seem to have
an almost uncanny knack of turning out to be accurate. So recent ‘concerns’
could mean bad news.
It turned out bad indeed.
The JDP government in Turkey doggedly refuses to acknowledge that Ankara is an
outsider to the Arab world despite ‘Muslim brotherhood’, a false assumption. One
other novelty in foreign policy has been to openly take sides in inter- as well as intra-
Arab disputes. Having created enmity where none existed before in the case of Israel
is another dimension of hazardous novelties. Lastly, US foreign policy is outsourced
to the Sunni/Wahhabi block to encircle Iran and break Tehran’s bonds with Syria,
where higher stakes are involved compared to Kermit Roosevelt’s conspiracy to oust
the Mossadegh government in 1953.13 When the Iranian government, under Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, attempted to uphold the nationalization of oil, the
British asked the CIA’s help to remove him from the government and restore the
young Shah Reza Pahlavi to power. Details of this conspiracy were revealed by
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Roosevelt himself in 1979 and in other studies. Current studies, however, point to the
fact that this intervention was the major cause of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and
of anti-Americanism.
The overall policy implications raise more questions than they provide answers,
because prospects grow increasingly bleak. Is the region facing autonomous and
eventually sovereign Kurdistan(s)?; prolonged civil war and human violations on
ethnic/sectarian lines between Iraqi and Syrian Arabs and Kurds?; how will Turkey
respond to increasing numbers of refugees from Syria?; why did Turkey’s leadership
not see that both Iran and Syria would use the PKK card as retaliation?; why does
Ankara allow the foreign ‘jihadist’ inflow to Turkey?; is a regional war inevitable?; and
if so, how is it possible that such a catastrophe is likely to remain limited?
The USA and Turkey–Middle East Connection: The 20th Century
During the height of the cold war (1946–62), insecurities came to the fore.
Appraising the world solely from cold war dualities, Turkey’s DP government relied
on superficial premises to draw its proximate Arab neighbours to regional security
formations such as the Middle East Command/Middle East Defense Organization
(MEDO, 1951) as well as the Baghdad Pact (1955) to contain Soviet expansionism.
Memoirs of the US Ambassador to Turkey (1951–53) George McGhee, point to
the diplomatic efforts exerted by Britain and the USA in the background, and Turkey
as the supposed point of attraction, to draw the Arab countries together in a defence
pact. MEDO, under British command and control was an ill-conceived project from
the beginning. It was not the revolutionary Egypt of Nasser, but King Farouk’s
government that rejected the offer. And when Egypt did not comply, the rest would
not follow. In 1951, a satire journal in Cairo carried the caricature of Turkey’s
President Celal Bayar as a dog whose leash was held by Britain. The Turkish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs protested with an extremely strong note.14
MEDO’s counterpart, the Baghdad Pact survived for three years. The only Arab
country that responded semi-favourably to the idea of a pact was the Iraqi monarchy.
Even then, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Said, stalled by insisting that Ankara
must first convince Egypt. Since Ankara’s relations with revolutionary Egypt had
started on a negative note, subsequent charm offensives from Turkey were to no avail.
It took a personal visit from Foreign Minister Fatin Ru¨s¸tu¨ Zorlu and Prime Minister
Adnan Menderes who pressured Iraq to sign the pact.
President Bayar had warned McGhee of probable Arab rejection. However,
Menderes’ enthusiasm to lead a Middle Eastern NATO was overwhelming. Reports
from surveys conducted by US embassies and consulates in the region upon
McGhee’s initiative, had confirmed Bayar’s assessment about the non-cooperative
Arab attitudes towards Turkey.15 However, Menderes pursued the issue. ‘In the cities
of the Arab world, people are debating whether Israel or Communism is the Arab’s
Enemy Number One’, wrote Arnold Toynbee.
Some are opting for ‘positive neutrality’, others for the Baghdad Pact. But
most Arabs do not live in towns; they work in the fields or on the steppe;
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and Arab farmers today are dreaming, not of pacts and treaties, but of
pumps and tractors. The pumps and tractors are already operating in large
numbers. The big current event in the Asian Arab countries—an event that
is certainly going to make history—is the renaissance of the ‘Fertile
Crescent’.16
Meanwhile, a social movement in Egypt, which turned into formidable organizations
throughout the Middle East in our time, Ikhwan-ı Muslimin (the Muslim
Brotherhood), had already become powerful among the destitute classes of society.
Following Marxist thought, the Brotherhood had decided that revolution would
come not at the level of state, but society. Something akin to the Socialist
International was loosely being organized (Sunni International?). The Charge´
d’Affaires of the Turkish embassy observed that the Brotherhood had recruited some
100 youngsters from poor families in Turkey for training at Al Azhar University for
the purpose of spreading the call to return to Islam.17
Iraq and Syria followed Egypt in tandem with incessant military interventions and
turned into Baathist regimes, adopting socialism, undertaken partly for populist
reasons and partly to forestall indigenous communists. The concomitant Soviet aid
and influence thus became a nightmare for Turkey’s government. Not only did it fear
a military intervention against itself (a self-fulfilling prophecy), but now it also felt
squeezed by the Soviet threat on its northern border as well as southern, in addition
to its communist neighbour, Bulgaria.18
In 1956, in an effort to downsize US conventional forces in Europe, President
Dwight Eisenhower suggested that ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear
warheads may be deployed in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries.
Menderes reached out in his 1957 speech to the NATO Council. He iterated that the
authority to use the missiles should be given to NATO command or to the national
Chiefs of Staff.19 In 1958, Turkey deployed troops at the Syrian border and conducted
military manoeuvres. Moscow and Damascus brought the threat of aggression to
the United Nations (UN), whereby Turkey was cautioned against any rash move. The
same year, Nasser moved to realize his most ambitious vision of Pan Arabism by joining
with Syria in the United Arab Republic (UAR). In a counter move, Turkey was
instrumental in forging unity between the Iraqi and Jordanian monarchies in a federal
state. This, however, lasted less than two months until the military takeover in Iraq. The
UAR also split in 1961 mainly because of rivalries between Syria and Egypt as to who
was the real leader of the Arab world.
The assumption that historic ties to the region under the Ottoman Empire
eschewed the strength of Arab nationalism and the traumas of decolonization.
Ankara was contemptuous of as well as condescending towards the republican
nationalistic military interventions in Egypt, Iraq and Syria alike.20 Politically
speaking, therefore, Pahlavi Iran became the focus of cooperation and significance
both for Turkey and the USA after the Iraqi revolution when the Baghdad Pact
dissolved in 1958. The new security formation entitled CENTO (Central Treaty
Organization) comprised the northern tier countries, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey under
the auspices of Britain and the USA as observer.
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The premise that security concerns would weigh beyond everything else also
proved to be misleading, because Turkey and its allies’ security concerns did not
converge with that of the Arab countries. Further was the collective memory which
pointed to Turkey for having broken away from the ranks of the Muslim majority
Arab world by abandoning the Arab alphabet, adopting secularism, and perhaps
worse yet, having voted for the partition of Palestine in 1948 and for recognizing the
state of Israel one year later. In 1963, Nasser told a Turkish journalist that he was
ready to switch sides if only the USA could ‘solve the Israel problem’ and extend
developmental aid to Egypt. When the excitable young journalist relayed this message
to then Prime Minister I˙smet I˙no¨nu¨, he only met with a quizzical smile.21 Kemal
Karpat traces Arab discontent with the Turks to 1856, when a reform edict declared
equality of all religions in the Empire.22 The originator of the term ‘clash of
civilizations’, Bernard Lewis, elaborates on the divisive effect of religions, because all
three religions of the book reserve ‘the truth’ only to themselves.23
Yet another act, closer in time, which conditioned Arabs against the Turks was
Ankara’s incorporation of the strategically viable province of Alexandretta between 1936
and 1939. The province was one of the administrative districts in Syria, divided by the
French mandatory. It also had one of the three best harbours for a naval base in all of the
eastern Mediterranean as well, the other two being Alexandretta of Egypt and Turkey’s
Marmaris.24 Facing Cyprus across the sea with two British bases, the harbour could
accommodate friendly forces and deter hostile powers. The French mandate was ending
in 1936 and Ankara grew increasingly leery of the former mandate’s vulnerability in the
upcoming war. Nazi Germany’s probes into Turkey through its vast propaganda machine
and anchluss with Austria in 1938 was noted in Turkey as ‘une sorte de boulevard des
Etats danubiens et balkaniques’.25 There just might be no end to Nazi transgression. In
1939, when the territory came into Turkey’s fold, a direct line of communication was
secured with the British in Cyprus and a tripartite agreement between Turkey, Britain
and France followed. The next significant timeframe for Turkey and the USA in the
Middle East would begin after the Second World War.
The USA had not been a total stranger in that geography. American traders and
sailors, adventurers under the employ of ‘exotic’ rulers of the East, Protestant
missionaries, schools and hospitals left their mark in the 19th-century Levant and
Anatolia.26 However, it was not until after the Second World War that the USA began to
get politically involved, specifically on six occasions. One was to establish a low-profile
military aid relationship with Turkey in 1946 upon President I˙smet I˙no¨nu¨’s request.
The second development was when Greece and Turkey were admitted to NATO in
1952, which entailed access to bases. Third was the US role in dismantling Mohammad
Mossadegh’s premiership in Iran mainly because he upheld the nationalization of
the oil industry (1953). The fourth occasion which entrenched American security
interests in the region was the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957, which enabled the USA to
intervene in the Middle East upon the invitation of governments who faced armed
aggression, direct or indirect. Not only did this doctrine become operational one year
later in Lebanon, it also caused concern to all political parties in opposition.27
A fifth occasion of significance, the American presence in Saudi Arabia, was
described by Toynbee as follows:
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Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, Dhahran: the names are Arabic, but the three cities—
planted as though they are on the Arabian desert—are as American as New York
itself. America in Arabia: this is one of the wonders of the present-day world.28
Toynbee added, however, ‘Quo vadimus? What lies in the future? May the God who is the
God of both Muslims and Christians guide Man’s racing feet out of the paths of
destruction.’29 In the not so distant north, Turkey grew consistently uneasy about ‘out of
area’ operations conducted by the USA due to accidents that involved American
reconnaissance planes over Soviet air space both because it resonated on Turkey’s
sovereignty and also caused diplomatic scandals with the Soviets respectively in 1960,
1965 and 1967.30 The cold war began to subside after a major crisis over the Soviet
missiles in Cuba in 1962. As of the 1970s, what is now called the Gulf Cooperation
Council countries, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates came into the fold of US national interest for energy security.31 The anchor
was Saudi Arabia, having negotiated a commitment from President Franklin Roosevelt
for protection in 1945. Therefore, the sixth and last entrenchment of America in the
geography was intact.
The USA had at least some allies in the Arab world and Pahlavi Iran (until the 1979
Islamic Revolution). The same case did not hold for Turkey. After the military
intervention in 1960, Ankara took initiatives towards a rapprochement with Arab
countries, instigated mainly by the Cyprus problem. Relations with Iraq assumed
cordiality, but the Syrian campaign to reclaim Hatay received immediate support
from the Arab League and a declaration by all Arab ambassadors in Ankara in favour
of Damascus. Consequently, Turkey’s President Cemal Gu¨rsel announced in
I˙skenderun (Alexandretta) that any attempt by Syria to reunite with Hatay would be
considered casus belli.32 The border was sealed and mines laid on the Turkish side.
The 1966 land reform in Syria resulted in the expropriation of private properties
owned by Turkish citizens. Turkey retaliated in kind. The Iraqi leadership, on the
other hand, ignored the situation and declared goodwill towards Ankara.33
The 1970s political scene in Turkey was marked by short-lived coalition governments,
domestic terrorism between the rightists, leftists and ‘religious youth’. Further, in 1974,
Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus resulted in the US arms embargo, coupled with
foreign credits being curtailed. That same year there was a most unlikely coalition
government in Turkey, with the social democrat Bu¨lent Ecevit’s (PM) Republican
People’s Party (RPP) and islamist Necmettin Erbakan’s (Deputy PM) National Salvation
Party (NSP). A furious, but private reaction came from the Saudi King Faisal. Speaking
to a Turkish journalist, the King accused Ecevit of being a communist and Baathist. He
was even more angry with Erbakan for having ‘sold out to the communists’. Faisal refused
to listen to arguments to the contrary. In March 1974, the top foreign affairs consultant to
the Saudi King relayed a message to the same journalist that the Americans were clearly
against both Ecevit and Erbakan. Accordingly, Washington had asked Riyadh to freeze its
relations with Turkey. At the time Erbakan had scheduled a visit to Saudi Arabia in search
for oil and credit. Could that visit be cancelled asked the consultant. The message
was delivered in as politically correct language as possible, but Erbakan went anyway,
only to be met with a cold shoulder.34
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Coalition governments were unable to harness domestic terrorism in Turkey,
which resulted in the September 1980 military intervention. An offshoot of myriad
terrorist organizations turned out to be PKK, whose militants were accommodated in
Syria and Iraq. Subsequently, in 1979 the US arms embargo ended and a new Defense
and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1980. By then, the 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran which ensued in the hostage crisis between Tehran and
Washington reverted attention to the Middle East. The situation from then on had
direct implications for Ankara. Upon suggestions that Turkey would be the most
convenient place from which to stage military operations towards the Persian Gulf
region, Turkey’s Ambassador to the USA S¸u¨kru¨ Elekdag˘ had to reiterate what
Ankara’s policy vis-a`-vis the Middle East was:
It would be absurd and unreasonable to expect Turkey to support or
participate in an ‘out-area’ operation which is not jointly supported by all
members of the alliance. Furthermore, these theories and hypotheses totally
neglect the principles guiding Turkey’s Middle Eastern policies. Namely, to
pursue a strict policy of non-interference in internal affairs of the Arab and
Middle Eastern states, to refrain from taking sides in inter-Arab disputes and
conflicts, and to accelerate the remarkable new thrust in Turkish policy toward
Middle East and Islamic countries in all fields, especially economic,
commercial and cultural. Therefore, in candor I would say that in weighing
United States stakes in Turkey, the criterion should be the present considerable
military and strategic contribution of Turkey to the Western alliance, and not
the possibilities of involving Turkey in Middle East contingencies.35
The next two decades were transitional years for Turkey, which opened to the market
economy, was enthusiastic about European Union (EU) membership, and enhanced
its relations with the former Soviet realm as well as with Russia and the Middle
East, including Israel, at long last without any apologies.36
Towards the century’s end, identity politics became fashionable not only in
academia, but also in government circles. In the aftermath of 9/11, these policies
became operational in the context of the war against terrorism. The new, but hallow
identity nomenclature portrayed as either ‘radical Islam’ or ‘moderate Islam’ became
dominant in references to the Middle East. It was just another step from there to
promote Turkey’s Middle Eastern identity. Turkey, under the JDP governments
embraced this identity, blended it with its version of ‘Grand Strategy’ based on
civilizational geopolitics and vainglorious rhetoric. The JDP, however, managed to
increase economic relations with the Middle East and made inroads in Africa, for the
first time in Republican history, Ankara became a donor country, and succeeded in
holding a rotational position on the UN Security Council (2010–11). The USA–
Turkey–Middle East triangle is diversified by many factors and has grown multiple
angles at present, so it may best be analysed in concentric circles, all of which are
intricately connected.
150 Nur Bilge Criss
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:2
8 0
7 M
ay
 20
14
 
The Present
A salient tapestry of the post-cold war world are the dynamics of integration and
disintegration. Disintegration in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Sudan were attended by
mass murders and other atrocities. The former ideological warfare deteriorated into
‘Africa’s dirty wars’.37 Atrocities resulted in a new concept, the legitimate right and
duty of the international community to act collectively against states which
perpetrate or allow inhumanities. ‘By the end of 2001 [the UN] International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) formulated undertaking
humanitarian intervention in terms of responsibility to protect (RtoP).’38
Humanitarian intervention was not written into international law, because many
countries had reservations about its use and misuse. Although accepted as a moral
norm, the UN decided to take it up on a case-by-case basis.
There are certain stipulations, however, which make humanitarian intervention
a possibility. One is the responsibility of the sovereign state to protect its people.
Secondly, if the first stipulation fails, international assistance and capacity building
to protect may become operational. Third, timely and decisive collective action may
be taken against a state. This brings the topic to our second concentric circle, the
foreign policy world of the USA. Towards the end of her tenure as US Secretary of
State in 2008, Condoleeza Rice stated that through democratic state building
‘Washington will change the world in America’s image’.39
Troubled by American unilateralism, an international law expert wrote that the
1997 Project for the New American Century
called for an international order that was friendlier to America’s security,
prosperity, and principles, and that targeted international rules such as
those that allowed the detention of Pinochet and the creation of the Kyoto
Protocol and the ICC (International Criminal Court) statute.40
Sands laments ‘a sadly exceptionalist and isolationist perspective that sees America as
an island of law hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world’.41
That exceptionalism was laid out by a strategic consultant in terms militaristic and
managerial, inspired by systems administration.42 The lexicon of this strategy exudes
aggression. Accordingly, until 9/11, globalization meant the free flow of capital,
finances, trade and professionals. However, the global war on terrorism introduced
a security dimension to globalization. Countries which had integrated their national
economies with the global economy and complied with the security rule set made up
the Functional Core. However, the Middle East, to a large extent, which remained
outside interconnectedness was the Non-integrating Gap. The Seam States that
shared borders with the non-integrating gap, such as Turkey were expected to
contribute to international security by facilitating integration. Another connection is
that of the Military–Market nexus which is both good for business and national
strategy. Hence, when resistance to globalization results in conflict, military
operations are followed by military and civilian systems administrators to manage
business contracts.
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According to Naomi Klein, the official discourse, ‘the triumph of deregulated
capitalism has been born of freedom, that unfettered free markets go hand in hand
with democracy’ does not reflect reality. Imposition of this version of capitalism is
enforced through ‘brutal coercion’.43 She contends that exploiting crisis and disaster
has been the modus operandi of the Milton Friedman school of economics.44
Compounding the positions taken above, the strategy of preventive war also
evolved into thinking that ‘by their very existence dictatorships constituted an
unacceptable threat. The only sure remedy to the problem of vulnerability . . . was to
bring despotic regimes into full compliance with American norms, using force if
necessary to do so.’45 In 1979, the Carter Doctrine had already declared that the
Persian Gulf region was a vital national security interest and any assault there would
be met by military force.46
Plausibly having drawn some lessons from the war on Iraq, President Barack Obama
opts for using ‘smart power’, special operations units. However, this does not preclude
indirect intervention. Consequently, in the Syrian crisis the idea that regional states
should take on the responsibility has been flaunted. This policy directly implicates
Turkey, which comprises the innermost picture of the concentric circles.
When insurrections began in Syria, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an adopted
an inimical rhetoric against President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey accommodated
refugees from Syria. Then, the ‘Syrian Free Army’ and leader of the Syrian Muslim
Brothers also met with Turkish hospitality. However, things began to take on a
different hue with speculations about Turkey’s possible intervention in Syria, which
emanated from Al-Hayat and Ashraq Al Awsar dailies, sponsored by Saudi Arabia and
published in London.47 In July 2012, Ian Lesser wrote:
The evolution of the Syrian conflict, and its broader regional consequences,
will have important implications for Ankara’s regional role and the future
of Turkish–Western relations. The repair of Turkish–Western strategic
relationship is no longer optional but essential for both sides.48
Consequently, in addition to all the threats emanating from Turkey’s neighbourhood,
Russia included, its Western relations were also at stake. This threatening phrase alone
points to the failure of the ‘new’ Turkish diplomacy, which cornered itself into a
quagmire. While the worst scenario unfolded in Syria, where anarchy reins, opposition
forces on the ground are fractured into mobs led by strongmen sworn to vengeance.49
In February 2012, Cemil C¸ic¸ek, Speaker of the Parliament, attended a G20 conference
in Riyadh. A Saudi journalist commented, ‘At the beginning of the Syrian crisis Turkish
authorities were very enthusiastic about resolving the crisis. But, we do not see the same
enthusiasm recently.’ C¸ic¸ek scoffed, ‘Don’t push us on that subject. Don’t everyone stay
on the sidelines expecting Turkey to resolve this problem. No one should succumb to
oriental cunning (S¸ark kurnazlıg˘ı). Turkey is carrying out its own responsibilities.’50
Apart from the orientalist irony, this was the first public signal that the Turkish
government had no intention of intervening in Syria unilaterally.51 In fact, when a
Turkish unarmed reconnaissance jet crashed in Syrian home-waters, thunderous
rhetoric followed. Erdog˘an called for a NATO meeting, perhaps to invoke Article 5,
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that an attack on one member is to be considered an attack on all (operationalized
only one time, after 9/11). To the contrary, the final resolution was based on Article 4
and declared support for Turkey.
JDP’s former wavering policies in support of Iran, Hamas, Syria, Sudan and Libya
crystallized in a turnabout when Erdog˘an realized that he might be totally isolated from the
Allies.52 The bout was remarkable against al-Assad after having lifted visa requirements,
holding common cabinet meetings and even spending holidays en famille.
Ziya O¨nis¸ wrote, ‘The more that Turkey is actively involved in the domestic and
regional politics of the Middle East, the more it is likely to contribute to further
instability and divisiveness in an already highly volatile region.’53 However, there is no
indication that the leadership considers that their policies have been counter-
productive with Allies and adversaries alike. As with any other essay, there must be an
overall conclusion, however this story does not end.
Conclusions in a State of Flux
State behaviour during the cold war is reasonably well documented and therefore is
comprehensible. At present, the Turkish government’s assumption that historic ties
and investments would help bring the ‘non-integrating gap’ into the global economy
proved a fragile base for policymakers. Building a better future is important, but the
architects need to be indigenous. People should be allowed to settle their own scores,
because intervention brings unforeseen results.
In Turkey’s case, the JDP government got involved in the Syrian crisis as well as
adopting an adversarial position against Baghdad. Today, PKK is emboldened by the
crises and stepped up its terrorist attacks in south-eastern Turkey. Why did the JDP
fail to see that Damascus would play the PKK card once again, if desperate?
Iraq recently cancelled the Turkish Petroleum Company’s contract. Baghdad’s
retaliation targets policies perceived to be sectarian against the Shi’i Prime Minister,
Nouri al-Maliki; JDP’s circumvention of Baghdad by concluding oil agreements with
the Kurdish autonomous region, and against protection extended to the former
deputy prime minister, Tariq al-Hashimi (Sunni), accused of inciting terrorism.
Residues of Syrian bombs are falling on Turkish territory. One explanation was that
Assad may be signalling that he is capable of expanding Syria’s civil war to the region
unless foreign countries stop empowering the opposition.54
A Russian analyst recently criticized the JDP for collaboration with al-Qa’ida.55 This
does not bode well for Turkey’s international standing if Igor Pankratenko’s evidence
can be corroborated. Civilizational geopolitics and its trajectory Sunni/Muslim
brotherhood may be maximized by the JDP to collaborate with the radical foreign
elements against Damascus. This is not welcome to the USA anymore than to Russia as
the creation of the Syrian National Coalition in Doha attests. Quo vadimus?
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